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Derek White, 2003 |
 Derek White |
Evil, and the Goodness of The God of The Bible In talking of what Francis Schaeffer calls 'the new theology' ['68 prophetic] (1)Schaeffer says that this 'new theology' sees man as 'fallen'. "This means that there is no moral answer to the problem of evil and cruelty. Because man, whether somehow created by a curious thing called god or kicked up out of the slime by chance, has always been in this dilemma, the dilemma is part of what being a 'man' is. And if this is what man intrinsically is, and he has always been like this, then the French art historian and poet, Baudelaire, is right when he says, 'If there is a God, he is the devil.' This statement was simply the logical deduction from the premise that man, with all his cruelty and suffering, is now as he has always been." However, the Bible states that God is a God of love and faithfulness: "Yahweh - the compassionate and gracious God, slow to anger and abounding in love and faithfulness." (Exodus 34:6) The Greek philosopher Epicurus (2) asked whether God could possibly be good and all powerful at the same time. In other words: was God willing to prevent evil [suffering] but not able [impotent in other words], or able [omnipotent even] but malevolent. Logically speaking one would presume that God could not be omnipotent and impotent at the same time, neither could God be benevolent and malevolent at the same time unless he was something akin to the Mad Hatter in Carrol's fairy story. Nothing much has changed since the sardonically expressed views of Epicurus. However the wording in our time has become a little more sophisticated. The philosophical/evidential problem of evil is in the eye of the beholder, so to speak. Twentieth/Twenty first Century 'Epicuruses', such as William Rowe(3), tend to qualify their target of rebuke a little more clearly than Epicurus, stating the necessary qualifications of: omnipotence, omnipresence, and goodness. It follows, from this premise, that the three cannot logically go together because the evidence in our world dictates otherwise. It is important to understand what is meant when the objector refers to 'evil'. For the sake of clarification the evil that they object to and that I shall be referring to is that which adversely affects the life experience and life expectancy of human beings (I shall not be dealing with effects of what is called 'Natural Evil' on animals or other life forms ['nature red in tooth and claw] - apart from a reference to life before the fall. The main focus rather is to 'deal' with the effects of involuntary pain and suffering as experienced by the human race - Homo Sapien if you like.) The experience, in other words, that which reduces the 'quality' of life or reduces the pleasures (Marilyn McCord Adams says that to argue for the falsity of Christianity on the grounds that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, pleasure-maximiser is incompossible with a world such as ours, because Christians [at least those taking the Bible seriously] have never believed that God was such a 'pleasure-maximiser' anyway. [ McCord Adams; Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God P210]) of the human experience. These experiences would be: pain [physical and psychological], deprivation, social injustice [man's inhumanity to man], premature death etc. Whatever one makes of the definition it is clear that evil's affects are felt strongly and that it [evil] is the cause of pain, despair and estrangement. Thomas Aquinas(4) concludes that the word 'evil' does not signify any essence, form or substance.(5) Evil, he advocates, can only be described as an 'absence of goodness'. Anything that lacks 'goodness' can, according to Aquinas, be described as 'evil', which, for Aquinas, simply means less than good. God, according to Aquinas, did not, and could not have created anything less than good. Man has rebelled against God and is consequently less than perfect - although he [man], according to this view, was created as a perfect being; it is nevertheless this absence of God's created 'best', that results in evil (I don't personally espouse the view that Genesis infers that man was made perfect, because clearly GOD is the only perfect being, rather that God's the creation of man in his image means that mankind reflects the image of his creator.) So far I have no problem and happily concur with Aquinas (My comments are not meant to be patronising - as if they could for Aquinas was a brilliant mind and I am humbly seeking to give my opinion) However, according to Aquinas' theology a malignant tumour, for example, can be considered 'good' because it performs as it should perform - the way malignant tumours tend to, that is. The evil (lack of good) consists in the privation of health in the affected person. So, for example, a cancer is not evil because there is no such thing as evil. God created all things, and if, as some suggest, there is such a thing as evil, God must have created it. This view, I suggest, will not do. The Biblical picture depicts evil as being an entity and not an absence (Aquinas was apparently influenced by Aristotelian philosophy, which came to Europe through the Muslims in Spain. Furthermore, Aquinas had followed some ideas of the Islamic philosopher Avicenne [see Larrimore on Aquinas: The problem of Evil] It is possible, I suggest, that Aquinas' ideas on the nature of 'evil' may have been influenced by Islamic teaching, which is fatalistic. Furthermore, Islamic teaching denies a literal Genesis fall, and therefore does not espouse any drastic change to the condition of mankind vis a vis 'original sin'.. The Qur'an does however say that people are evil and that they deserve God's [Allah's] condemnation [Faith to Faith - Christianity & Islam in Dialogue]. My point here is: If there is no 'fall', there is no possibility of giving it as a reason for pain and suffering.). It is an entity because it is more than privation for it has manifested itself through the rebellion of Satan, his host of followers and through the consequent fall of mankind as recorded in Genesis chapter three. Aquinas' ideas, for all their ingenuity, are not, in my opinion, able to answer the question posed by the likes of Rowe et al(6) who raise as evidence against the existence of God: the Problem of Evil. Aquinas presumes that God's original 'plan of creation' included deprivation and suffering [privation] - hence his kind of 'apologetic'. Aquinas' reasons simply state the de facto situation of 'privation' Mackie (Evil & Omnipotence - The Problem of Evil P.29) says that good and evil are necessary counterparts as 'redness' must be to 'non-redness' - but unless evil is merely the privation of good they are not logical opposites. The point is that the use of the word 'privation' is a play on words. For if someone experiences pain it is not 'good', according to their experience. One could say it is something akin to Islam's account of the will of Allah (Ibid). Aquinas is correct, however when he says that something is good if it is fully in accordance with its nature. God is completely good as God can not be other than he is and, therefore, is fully in accordance with his nature. For God to be evil, he would have to act contrary to his immutable nature; this, according to Aquinas, would be illogical.(7) Theodicy
God IN Dock It is important that time is not wasted on false 'gods' - there are several possible candidates however Mackie (10), helpfully, narrows the field by suggesting that the only likely candidate is the God who is or is known as: omnipotent, omniscient & good. (all other 'gods' would probably be acquitted on the grounds that they were less culpable) The God in question then is the 'god' allowed by the 'Restricted Standard Theism' model [RST](11); this is not the God of Islam or the God of the Deists, and certainly not the 'god' of Buddhism or one of the 'gods' of Hinduism - the God in dock is none other than the God of the Bible. And, as it is this God to whom the charges are made, it is therefore to this God, the alleged sovereign God of the universe, that we shall offer defence. God
is Sovereign, isn't he? The psalmist waxes eloquent when he says, " The earth is the Lord's, and everything in it." (Psalm 24:1). This world is, I believe, God's world. God, I suggest, is imminent (Imminence does not necessarily mean interference. God is, I maintain, both 'Transcendent' and 'Imminent' yet He lets free will reign - although he may intervene should He so desire.) and He is therefore, I argue, compassionately concerned with His creation - even with you and me. Those of us who believe in the authority and reliability of the Bible can start with at least the following assumptions given by David Hunt(13) in his book 'Defence of the Faith'.
If we are willing to give up the above assumptions then the question
of evil may no longer be a problem. Swinburne (14) suggests that when we consider the omniscience of God we do it carefully less we err: Swinburne says that God cannot be required to know what is logically impossible to know, and that it is logically impossible to know what someone will do freely 'tomorrow'. Although it may well be 'logically' impossible for you or I to know what someone will do 'tomorrow', even though we may have some idea, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that an omniscient God may know exactly which 'free-will' choice will be made. This is not to say that God can do the 'logically' impossible rather that His omniscience is beyond our comprehension, which allows for mystery. The issue of God's omniscience has recently caused quite a response from those who hold a strongly Calvinistic view of events; this response has been fuelled by the 'theology' of the Open Theists who simply deny that God knows anything about the future because he can not have knowledge of it before it occurs. However, being convinced that God is ultimately sovereign over all things does not mean that one has to accept the view that God has pre-ordained all things. If God has pre-ordained all things, it surely follows that God is, indeed, culpable regarding 'evil', making God directly responsible for suffering in the world. This, I suggest, is the only possible conclusion if God pre-ordains every action of His creatures and every consequent punishment for their 'behaviour'. God would therefore be omnipotent, omniscient but not good - at least not in a way that is consistent with the common interpretation of the word. Being 'good' simply because 'God is good' is not the same as 'being good' For God to say 'Do not kill' but at the same time to kill & destroy himself is surely a contradiction in terms.
God's Foreknowledge & The Adamic Fall Being
'Free' to Choose For example, take some state of affairs that God did not bring about. Call it S. God's not having brought about S is a logically possible state of affairs. But this is not a state of affairs that God can bring about. For as soon as He has brought it about, it is no longer a state of affairs that he has not brought about: 'All persons always freely choose to do what is right.' The reason is that as God brings about that state of affairs, the people are no longer choosing to do what is right freely. If 'bringing about' is a causal notion, and if God is causing them to choose what is right, then they are not doing so of their free will. So it is not the case that God could bring it about that people always freely choose to do right.(18) John Frame(19) suggests that, since Christianity is a revelation from God it should be no surprise that some mysteries are 'insoluble mysteries'. Frame (20) further suggests that it would be more preferable to leave the problem of evil unsolved than to resort to 'drastic measures' - measures that demean the character of God. This, in my opinion, simply leaves God guilty as tried. Of course if, as Frame suggests,(21) libertarian freedom does not exist, then it cannot serve(22) as a solution to the problem of evil. (I entirely agree with Frame when he says that there are mysteries - I should hope so otherwise God would not be God. However I do not and cannot agree that God does not allow mankind free will: that is the ability to make real choices - choices that have consequences for future events - even if it means that we are out of our depth when it comes to fully understanding God's sovereignty and free will at the same time. For the likes of Frame it is more important (to dismiss the possibility of free-will than to defend the goodness of God. I prefer to admit that the results of free-will choice and the possibility that God has foreknowledge of these choices is a mystery - a mystery that is beyond the realms of mankind's knowledge or indeed logic.))
Of course, if 'choice' does not exist then it cannot possibly serve
as a part of any theodicy. However, I maintain that it does, however
hard it may be to reconcile with certain systematic theological views.
God's Love " Deuteronomy 7:8; Psalm 91:14; Psalm127:2 (selective love(As far as I have been able to ascertain, from Scripture, God's love is somewhat restricted - restricted, that is, to those he chooses to reveal it. Nevertheless he does not impose it by means of manipulation.))
If God has a love for his creatures it makes little sense if He then does not allow these creatures the choice: whether to love Him or not. The
'Word' Love
Lewis: God has created mankind for a relationship with himself. He desires that we love him although he can and does exist without our love it is the love of mankind that He desires. Just look at the first commandment: "You shall have no other gods before me." (EX 20:3) Jesus talked about a new commandment, and that was to love God with 'all of our body, mind and soul'; there was to be no second place for God. If, however God has pre-programmed His, 'automaton', creatures so that they 'will' love Him then this is, surely, a contradiction in terms in that 'love' is not LOVE but merely a response to pre-programming. (It seems to me that the freedom to love is possibly the key to the whole question of God's allowing suffering in the first place. However, 'free will' and 'sovereignty' are issues that take almost as much 'paper' as The Problem of Evil.) "God is light; in him there is no darkness at all" (1 John 1:5)
Rebellion in The Garden Henri Blocher (29) says that the emphasis in the Genesis narrative(30) is on the criticism of the character of God. The God of the Hebrew Scriptures is depicted, by implication, as: 'selfish, jealous, oppressive and repressive.' Blocher refers to the 'sin' of doubt concerning God's motives, goodness and above all his love. But as Blocher points out , in Eden there is no explanation for the revolt. 'Its occurrence is without excuse'. Moreover Blocher says that the freedom of the creature-as-image can on no account provide an explanation. 'Created completely good, the creature had no reason to bring forth evil.'(31) However one reads the account of the Creation of Adam [the father of man] and Eve [woman] it is clear that the human species did not create itself. And as it is The God of the Genesis account who is on trial and not the 'genius' of chance evolution, it is to the Genesis account that we will look to for an answer. The Genesis story [chapter three] gives an account of what is commonly known as 'The Fall'. According to the Genesis account Adam & Eve had the ability to distinguish between, and to make 'good' and 'bad' choices with positive and negative consequences. They, with the help of a third party, made the wrong choice - a choice which changed their status and experience as living creatures. Augustine (32) said that God judged it better to bring good out of evil than not to permit evil to exist even though the 'evil' meant that the descendants of Adam & Eve, 'tainted with original sin'(33)would suffer the consequences, temporal and eternal. The 'Fall' therefore ushered in consequences and prohibitions [exclusions]. Before moving on there is the important question of the 'third party' to consider. In his section on Augustine's thinking vis a vis the Metaphysical Problem of Evil(34)
Norman Geisler paraphrases some of Augustine's thoughts. "If the
mind, being immediately conscious of itself, takes pleasure in itself
to the extent of perversely imitating God, wanting to enjoy its own
power, the greater it wants to be the less it becomes. In brief, a nature
is corrupted when by the abuse of the perfection of freedom it engages
in the pride of self-deification." This mindset is, most likely,
the genesis of rebellion in the 'good' creation of one God's archangels.
(In City of God (Needham, The Triumph Of Grace (Augustine 'On Grace
And Free Will) Augustine suggests that God's, possible, main purpose
in allowing the fall was to deal (long term) with the devil. John Wenham
(The Enigma of Evil [IVP] 1975 P184) says that, in its teaching about
the Devil and demonic powers the Bible 'clearly' implies a fall before
the Fall of man. He further suggests that it is not necessary to believe
[as many do] that there was no difficulty, suffering and physical death
[for all living things] prior to the fall of Adam & Eve.) Although there is no clear evidence in the Genesis account there is, as Wenham suggests, strong implication - implication that the Devil, in spite of the ability of God to destroy him, was cast down to Earth sometime [possibly some time] before the creation of the first man and woman. Dr F.A Tatford eloquently expresses it in his book The Prince of Darkness(36): When, in a past age, the highest angelic hierarchy inspired an audacious rebellion against the creator, there commenced an age-long conflict, which still continues to the present day. The Bible discloses little of the events which led to the loss by these mighty spirits of their pristine innocence and holiness, but it is clear that their revolt was deliberate and determined, and their fall was therefore inevitable. The rebellion continues and, for centuries past, has been evidenced particularly in the attempts to thwart the Divine purposes of blessing for man and to arouse the human race to active enmity to God. There are numerous references to Satan in the Old Testament [Numbers 22:22, 32; 1 Kings 11:14, 23;Psalm 109:6; 1 Chronicles 21:1; Job 1-2; Zech. 3:1,2] although there is only the example of the serpent in the account of the fall of man [Genesis 3:1],which is taken to refer to Satan. I conclude therefore that the nature and the importance the free will of creature[s] other than human beings should also be taken into consideration when considering the 'guilt' or 'innocence' of God. I suggest therefore that we have good reason to implicate Satan as the 'prime-mover' of the rebellion - the rebellion that produced a world in which evil has its sway.
I maintain that this world is the best possible world and that we have
to either deny this, because of our pre-conceived ideas of how our 'god'
should treat us, or accept it as a possible explanation. Plantinga (37)
says that if God is wholly good, and it was in his power to secure 'the
actuality' of a perfect world, we can presume that he would have done
so. Furthermore he says that we can conclude that God could not have
actualised a world containing moral good without actualising a world
without moral evil. I take it that Plantinga's 'actualising' is the
thought process through which God investigated all 'possible world scenarios'.
Presumably, an omniscient God had thought it through and come to the
right conclusion.
Of course it is up to God whether to create free creatures at all; but
if he aims to produce moral good, then he must create significantly
free creatures upon whose co-operation he must depend. Thus is the power
of an omnipotent God limited by the freedom he confers upon his creatures.(38)
Soul 'Redeeming' AND 'Soul Making' [John Hick] Now, for the benefit of those who, like Rowe, demand, that for the victims of any gratuitous violence or unnecessary suffering. e.g. 'the E2 example of moral evil [the murdered Sue]'(42) - there has to be a 'greater good (An example of 'greater good' would be the appearance of the murdered Sue in Heaven - where there is no pain or remembrance of a painful event - in Sue's case the terrible battering she received at the hands of her mother's boyfriend)'. God, I maintain, will always do right [Genesis 18:25] because a 'wholly good being' can do none-other. For those who have no choice, there will be justice. This we have to leave to the 'wholly good God', who will do right. A
Conclusion Evolution is not producing [on its own or with the help of God] a 'perfected species' nor is God bringing together - through different religious channels a people fit for heaven. He is reconciling humanity to himself through himself [2 Corinthians 5:17-19] - that is through the substitutionary atonement of Christ. Freedom for God's non-programmed creation was/is essential, this freedom had/has consequences. Freedom to choose must mean that there are both positive and negative choices - good and bad. For there to be 'good and bad' choices it follows that there has to be the possibility of evil [the opposite of good] as an inherent part of the human psyche. This, the God of the Bible, has done; the question is: Does this prove God's guilt? I think not; I realise of course that if I suggest that 'man is bad' it does not follow that 'God is good'. The fact is that if God gives choices there will be many who make the wrong choices - they will not have God's mercy at any price. And they will, as a consequence, accuse God of being unjust even though they 'chose' him not. And, yes, there are those who have not had the opportunity [as far as we can tell] but this will in no way prevent God from doing the 'right thing' [Genesis 25:18]. God's free-will plan makes all things possible; he has provided a way back for all of his creatures and this in spite of man's nature. Appendix
one: The 'Nature' of Man
Appendix two: Consequences With
this in mind it is highly likely that the promise of life was more than
'man' had experienced or imagined and that the fall of mankind brought
spiritual death, with eternal consequences. Extract sources:
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